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Article 4

Nutrition, Hydration and Cost Containment
Eugene F. Diamond, M.D.

Doctor Diamond is professor of clinical pediatrics at Loyola University
Stritch School of Medicine, Maywood, Illinois.

The New England Journal of Medicine has been the launching pad for
numerous bioethical trial balloons over the years. Death as the treatment
of choice for handicapped newborns was first suggested in print in the
pages of this prestigious journal by Duff and Campbell in 1973 and as late
as 1984, the imprimatur of publication was accorded to apologists for third
trimester abortion. The publication of "The Physician's Responsibility
Toward Hopelessly III Patients" (Wanzer, S. et al. N EJ M 310:955, 1984)1
must be scrutinized with this record as a background . There are to
different authors from to different institutions and, not unexpectedly,
much of the article is based on a n apparent consensus of different
backgrounds and widely separated geographical locations. As such, the
article is largely platitudinous and exhorts the profession toward a level of
care in informed consent already in place and accepted without
controversy in most places.
The placid landscape of pious pronouncements , how,ever, is disturbed
toward the end of the article by a somewhat muted explosion. After a slight
nod to assisted suicide, the authors state that it is "ethically permissible" to
withhold "nutrition administered by ... gastric tube" from "severely and
irreversibly demented patients" as well as those who are "pleasantly
senile."
It is obvious that the issue of the ethical permissibility of removing
feeding tubes is highly controverted in medical as well as legal circles. The
Claire Conroy case in New Jersey resulted in a decision that to remove the
tube would be unacceptable because it would result in death from "a new
and independent condition: dehydration and starvation." The Supreme
Court of New Jersey overruled the lower court and said that feeding could
be discontinued if a) a living will so directed; b) the patient verbally
directed the doctor to do so, or c) the physician determined that the burden
of continuing feeding outweighed its benefits.
The last point is fraught with danger in that it allows the attending
physician to determine when it is in the patient's best interest to be dead .
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In the widely publicized Herbert case in California, two physicians were
acquitted of a charge of murder after having taken a patient off of a
respirator and having removed his feeding tube. The basis for the murder
charge, however was the allegation that the removal of respirator support
and tube feeding had been carried out in an inappropriately hasty manner
on a patient whose coma had resulted from possible medical malpractice.
The survival of such a patient could result in the award of ajudgment far in
excess of that resulting from his early death. The Herbert case, then , does
not clearly support the removal of any and all feeding tubes on terminal
patients in California. The crux of the matter is whether the tube feeding
constitutes ordinary or extraordinary care. Wanzer and his co-authors
apparently base their position on the dubious notion that the insertion of a
feeding tube is more uncomfortable than death by starvation for the
"severely and irreversibly demented" patient or the "pleasantly senile"
patient.
This category of patient is , of course, quite separate from the terminally
ill , persistently vegetative, or brain dead patients (even in the authors'
classification in the article) . "Dementia" is in no way synonymous with
"dying", even if it happens most often to senile patients of advanced age.
Health care planners with a cost-benefit orientation would be delighted
with a national policy allowing the removal of feeding tubes and the
withholding of antibiotics from the entire class of demented , senile
patients in institutions. Savings in the billions could probably be achieved
annually . The cost in human terms , would be much greater. The American
system would slide further down the slippery slope of death worship.

Most IlIustrious Medical Publication
The New England Journal is America's most illustrious medical
publication. It does not, of course, establish standards of care and none of
its authors can claim to speak ex cathedra. It would be ingenuous,
however, not to expect that the principles enunciated in thl article would
impact heavily on the national conscience.
Those who deplore the "slippery slope" type of argumentation will have
to concede that there is a progression in permissiveness from the
recommendation that feeding be withheld from a) "brain dead" patients
b) patients in a "chronic vegetative state" c) "irreversibly demented"
patients and , finally, d) "pleasantly senile" patients. There is also
demonstrated here the tendency of a principle to expand to cover a
multitude of sins. The principle employed in various contexts is the "Right
to Privacy."2 This principle, unexpressed in the Constitution but alleged ,
by the Burger Court, to be implied in the fifth and fourteenth
Amendments , was enunciated as the pregnant woman's "right to privacy"
in reproductive decision-making which allowed her to abort her child
without the interference of law. 3 In the Baby Doe case in Bloomington,
Judge Premo , in the Indiana lower court, enunciated a parental privacy
right to choose one form of therapy over another. This right was said to
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extend to the private right to choose the option of death by starvation for
Baby Doe over the option of life-saving corrective surgery.4 The Right to
Privacy now being invoked is the private right to refuse medical treatment.
The principles underlying this right can be summarized as follows:
I . A competent patient has the right to refuse care even if refusal means
certain death.
2. The wishes of a once-competent patient, as expressed in writing or
verbally to friends or relatives, must be accorded great weight after he
has become incompetent.
3. When the patient is a child, parents' decisions should be respected
except when they are not in the child's best interest.
4. Physician will be protected if his concurrence in a decision to
withhold treatment is a good faith judgment in conformity with
generally accepted medical standards.
5. Where a once-competent patient never expressed a preference, if a
treatment is excessively burdensome or does not offer a reasonable
hope of benefit, it may be eliminated.
This latter balancing of burdens versus benefits is sometimes referred to
as the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality was
enunciated frequently by the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine in various contexts.5 1t was also adopted by
the California Appellate Court in the Barber case 6 and is employed by
various authors in the medical IiteratureJ·8 It is frequently cited as a
calculus to be preferred over the traditional "ordinary" versus
"extraordinary" means of prolonging life. It would seem, however, that the
differences are more semantic than substantive. A therapy imposing more
burdens than benefits would be "extraordinary" and a therapy offering
more benefits than burdens would be "ordinary". In fact, Pius XII, in his
epoch-making address to the anesthesiologists, alludes to burdens and
benefits while defining the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
means. 9
,
Factors in Patient's Medical Condition
It is obvious that the benefit / burden equation is relevant to the decision
to withdraw nutritional support and that the application of the principles
of proportionality will be contingent on the medical condition of the
patient.
I. If the patient is brain dead, there is obviously no benefit to be derived
from continuing nutrition except in those instances where it might be
maintained briefly for the benefit of harvesting organs for
transplantation.
2. If death is imminent, in the sense that it will occur with or without
treatment, in a short time, the provision of nutrition would be
ineffective and therefore could be withheld in those instances where it
could only be provided with great difficulty. 10 Connery has suggested
that "imminent" in this context means two weeks or less.
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3. If the patient is in a persistent vegetative state, the discontinuation of
hydration and nutrition would be highly questionable. A patient in a
persistent vegetative state is not presumed to be dying. The prognosis
for the regaining of consciousness and cognitive function is generally
presumed to be hopeless. However, in one highly publicized case ,
Sgt. David Mack of Minneapolis regained consciousness after 22
months of coma, to testify that he had been aware of happenings
around him for six months. II Najenson, in studies of Israeli
servicemen in coma as a result of injuries suffered in combat,
concluded that the prognosis could be improved by doubling the dose
of calories usually provided. 12 He concluded that the cause of death
was likely to be either aspiration or starvation. By increasing
feedings , and keeping patients upright, he achieved a 70% rate of
recovery . Whatever the prognosis, however, the duty to prolong life
is not abrogated by a hopeless prognosis. As Connery has pointed
out, "A patient may live a long time with a hopeless disease. One
cannot simply argue that the disease is incurable and thus no
obligation exists to preserve life."13 Brodeur, on the other hand ,
argues against perceiving quality of life and sanctity of life as polar
opposites. He states, "If life has a spiritual value to which temporal
ends are subordinated, how does the permanent coma tose patient
pursue these ends? If a pure physiological existence ensues, which is
what happens to a person in a persistent vegeta tive state, does a moral
obligation to continue life sustaining treatment still exist?"14 The
inference may be drawn that a person not in pursuit of spiritual
values may be leading a less than meaningful life. To paraphrase,
"Let he who is leading a full sp iritual life pull the first plug."
The problem in deciding about nutritional support for the
chronically comatose patient, may derive from the classification of
food and drink as modalities of medical treatment. As Meilaender
has pointed out, "The care involved in feeding is no't , in any strict
sense, medical treatment, even if provided in a hospital. It is ordinary
human care and is not given as treatment for any life-threatening
disease."1 5 Viewed in this light, feeding is neither useless nor
excessively burdensome. As strategies for providing nutritional
support have become more complicated, there has been a tendency to
evaluate them along with other invasive technologies such as
respirators and dialysis machines . It is probably more valid to view
self-feeding, assisted feeding , nasogastric tube feeding, hyperalimentation, and gastrostomy feedings as strategies for providing
basic support for persons capable of varying degrees of cooperation.
(The decision to use one or the other may be related as much to staff
convenience as patient competence. It may be a lot quicker to feed by
tube rather than teaspoon.) The benefit of feeding for the
permanently comatose patient is the preservation of his life even if he
has no capacity for life with the quality of consciousness. If anything,
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the burden of providing nutrition is reduced by the advancement of
technology (such as the technology of introd ucing flexible gastrostomy
tubes by way of endoscopy).16
4. Irreversibly demented patients and pleasantly senile. We mention
these categories only to condemn the rationale of using such
categories as an excuse for withholding food and water. Neither
category justifies the withholding of nutritional support, the tortured
rationale of the Wanzer group notwithstanding. 17
5. Problem afPain. Justification for the removal of nutritional support
is often included under the rubric of shortening a painful existence.
The British Medical Research Council 18 has reported in a long study,
that pain can be relieved without shortening life . An adequate
number of drugs has been shown to be available for control of pain of
varying severityl9 but these are apparently underutilized. 20 Withholding food and drink leads to death by starvation and dehydration.
Dehydration leads to death through hemoconcentration , hyperosmolarity , azotemia and hyperatremia. 21 Thirst and hunger to the
extreme will be experienced to the degree that the patient is conscious
and aware of these sensations. In summary, death by starvation is
painful. Pain resulting from terminal illness can be controlled
without shortening life. As Ramsey has pointed out, relief of
discomfort is a primary objective of the physician caring for the
terminally ill. 22

Legal Aspects
Myers has summarized the legal arguments for continuing patient
nourishment, as follows:
1. Nourishment is included within that minimum level of care that
anyone has a right to expect to be continued.
2. The expectation of certain minimal care, including nutrition, is
essential to the maintenance of trust and confidenc in the physicianpatient relationship.
3. The dignity of the patient requires that hydration and nutrition
continue , even when other care is withdrawn.
4. Artificial nourishment can be provided in a simple non-invasive
manner.
5. Nourishment is not medical treatment but a basic necessity of life.
6. To withdraw nourishment causes death by means independent of the
underlying illness.
7. Nourishment allows life to continue while the illness runs its course.
8. Withdrawal of nourishment is beyond the powers of the surrogate
decision maker.
9. Few, if any, patients express, in advance , a desire not to be fed .
10. To withdraw food and water is to cause a painful, agonizing death .23
Most of the above arguments are su bject to refutation in a court ofla w.
The death of Karen Quinlan in June of 1985 reminded the nation of
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her remarkable survival for over nine years after she was removed from a
respirator and provided comfort care only, including tube feedings . Karen
had originally lapsed into a coma following an ingestion of an unknown
combination of drugs. The etiology of the coma was unknown and the
prognosis, therefore, unsure. In November, 1975, Judge Muir refused the
Quinlan family permission to remove the respirator. In March, 1976, the
New Jersey Supreme Court overruled Judge Muir, stating that an
individual's right to privacy is "broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances."24
Although the Quinlan family never petitioned the court to remove her
feeding tube, many of the subsequent decisions can be considered Karen
Quinlan case law progeny.
Three Feeding Tube Cases
The three principle feeding tube cases are the Clarence Herbert case, the
Claire Conroy case and the Paul Brophy case. The facts of these cases are
summarized in Table l.
Since the Wanzer article is unquestionably the watershed publication on
the issue of discontinuing feeding for certain classes of patients, we must
examine the contents carefully for what seems to be a pro-euthanasia bias.
I. On the issue of assisted suicide, for example, the paper seems to be on
both sides of the issue. It says, "Although a rare patient may contemplate
suicide, the physician cannot participate by assisting in the act, for this is
contrary to the law." The subliminal message is that there is regret about
the law. The next sentence states , for example, "On the other hand , the
physician is not obligated to assume that every wish (for suicide) is
irrational and requires coercive intervention." From an ethical standpoint,
the fact that suicide is against the law is the least important reason why it
should not occur. The authors of the Wanzer article imply that while we
regretfully cannot assist suicide, we should not work too hard to prevent it.
The article, then, walks a fine line between an endorsemeft t of euthanasia
and the responsible choice to refuse therapy when its burden far outweighs
its benefiP5 It is important to note, for example, that the conferences upon
which the paper is based were held under the auspices of the Society /or the
RighI to Die. This is the latest name for the group which was known from
1938-1967 as the Euthanasia Society 0/ America and from 1967-1975 as
the Euthanasia Educational Council. The important distinction, in this
instance, is between what is done and why it is done. The Vatican
Declaration on Euthanasia in 1980 states, "By euthanasia is unde(~tood an
action or omission which of itself or by intention causes death."26 The
terms of reference for euthanasia, then, are to be found both in the
intention of the will and in the methods used .
The authors state that "financial ruin of the patient's family as well as the
drain on resources for other patients who are not hopelessly ill, should be
weighed in the decision-making process." Cost containment is thus given a
prominent place in the evaluation of therapy. Some Catholic authors
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boldly assert the propriety of including cost containment in the hierarchy
of values even in our society where no need to triage patients has been
demonstrable.
The danger of this emphasis is two-fold . First of all, there is no such
thing as inexpensive medical care. The attempt to delineate the difference
between ordinary and extraordinary care on the basis of cost alone in an
affluent society, is almost impossible. (I recently spent a few short days in
the hospital for a relatively minor surgical procedure and used up the
entire annual salary of a person who would be considered to be above the
poverty level.)
The second danger is, of course, the new categories for therapeutic
restriction created by the Wanzer group. They go beyond those with
terminal illnesses, beyond those in a persistent vegetative state to address a
group known as the "pleasantly senile." They define this group as those
with "a permanent mild impairment of competence, somewhat limited in
their ability to initiate activities and communicate but who appear to be
enjoying their moderately restricted lives." Members of this group are also
described as "biologically tenacious" meaning, apparently, that they are
not able to accept Governor Lamm's suggestion that they drop dead.

" Freedom from Discomfort" Recommended
All tHat is re~ommended for this group is "freedom from discomfort." If
emergency resuscitation and intensive care are required , "they should be
provided sparingly", based on, among other things , "the wishes of the
patient's family and the prospects for improvement." They recommend
that routine monitoring of vital signs should be stopped, diagnostic testing
should be stopped , antibiotics should be stopped . Then the clincher:
"Food and water given naturally or artificially (emphasis added) may be
provided or not depending on the patient's comfort." When we see how the
"pleasantly senile" category is defined , it is obvious that feeding anybody
above a certain age becomes an option rather than an omigation under the
principles of the Wanzer group and the Right to Die Society. Deciding not
to treat the elderly , whose competence is only mildly impaired , is a
quantum leap away from not resuscitating the terminally ill or not
prolonging the d ying process. It is an ugly, unconscionable step down that
slippery slope to active euthanasia.
The society has identified two goals for the care of the chronically and
terminally ill: a) cost containment and b) death with dignity. The medical
control of nutrition has been held out as a way of accomplishing both of
these goals simultaneously. Daniel Callahan , director of the Hastings
Institute, has noted: "Given the increasingly large pool of superannuated
chronically ill , physically marginal elderly, denial of nutrition could well
become the non-treatment of choice."27
Medicare spending increased seven-fold from 1970-1982. It now costs
the taxpayers $55 billion and may go broke by 1990. In that context, these
proposals could be viewed as a particularly nasty kind of cost-cutting. The
30

Linacre Quarterly

elderly have enough worries without wondering whether their attending
physician is about to label them pleasantly senile and write them off.
Should "health care planners" have anything to do with decisions to
withhold treatment? Even to suggest that they do reflects a monumental
change in the nature of medical practice in the United States. The medical
profession must resist the tendency for its allegiance to drift from the
patient to the paymaster.
As recently as three years ago , the idea that fluids and nourishment
might be withdrawn with legal and moral impunity would have been
repudiated and condemned by most health professionals.
The underlying philosophy is as follows:
I. That for a growing population of patients, the costs and burdens of
continued life are perceived as being too great to justify the
continuation of life support.
2. Death is accepted as the outcome to be desired for such patients.
3. The physician is to be the agent bringing about the desired
outcome.
The countervailing philosophy would be as follows:
I . The discontinuation of fluids and food should be forbidden except
in rare instances where it can be incontrovertibly demonstrated
that the problems of maintaining nutrition clearly outweigh the
acceptance of death by starvation. This philosophy should prevail
until there is much more certainty that denying nutrition will not
lead to inevitable calamities for the society.
The benefits of adhering to this alternative philosophy would be as
follows:
I . Patients will be protected. Prognosis for term of survival is one of
the least accurate and least scientific medical skills even where the
diagnosis is clear and accurate.
2. Society will be protected. The fa bric of society is threatened by a
drift toward the unscrupulous restriction of care out'of cost benefit
consideration.
3. Physicians will be protected. There is evidence that physicians are
much more inclined to provide fluids and nutrition in terminal
situations than so-called professional ethicists. Three out of four
physicians polled by Micetich, et al ,28 expressed a desire to provide
nutrition even to terminal, unconscious patients.
4. The Hippocratic tradition against direct euthanasia will be
preserved for the medical profession.
S. The role of the physician as patient advocate in quality of life
debates will be maintained.
6. The goals of medical therapy can be prioritized to include
provision of comfort and amelioration of severity as well as
complete recovery.
Most physicians would identify the care of the elderly and the terminally
ill as a largely unsatisfactory part of the total picture of American medical
August, 1986
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care. The United States wins the lion's share of Nobel prizes for medical
research and American medicine is on the cutting edge of advances in high
technology diagnostic and therapeutic achievement. The hospice
movement has represe nted a welcome development toward the
humanization of the care of the terminally ill. In all candor, however, it
must be admitted that the level of care in American nursing homes and
extended care facilities is more an occasion for scandal than . for
satisfaction. The quality of life for the elderly in these institutions provides ,
in the eye of the beholder, an inspiration for short-term, Draconian
solutions. The society which groans under the burden of providing acute
care under Medicare has been unwilling to accept the reality that personal
and financial disaster are still a part of the system for those whose terminal
illness escapes the time frame of acute care. As the makeup of the society
changes toward the inverted pyramid of an aging population , the need for
the medical profession to address the deficiencies of chronic care will
increase. As Mark Siegler has said, "If care is to be withheld , it should be
withheld from those who are strongest and most powerful for they are the
ones who can make the best case for themselves. The aged and
incompetent cannot speak for themselves and should, therefore, not have
to bear the burden of justifying their continued medical treatment."29
One person in nine is now over 65. By the 21 st century, it will be one in
five. There have been suggestions that everyone on Medicare be required
to have a living will. The National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws has approved a Model Living Will statute which
includes the provision of food and water under Medical TreatmenPO
During their deliberations in Minneapolis, the Conference defeated an
attempt to restrict the definition to artificially administered nutrition and
to exclude nutrition provided naturally.
Dr. Andre Wynen of Belgium, the Secretary General of the World
Health Organization, expressed the following well-grounded fear.)l "N ow
that cost containment in health care is an everyday threat to the basic
interest of the patient, the conflict calls for the presence of his natural
defender, the doctor, to help him against the self-interest of the majority.
Just as the lawyer defends an accused in society, so must the doctor defend
the patient against his own family when the welfare of the elderly or
handicapped is at stake."
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Civil Law Court Decisions
1. S lale of California - The Case of Clarence Herbert , age 55 , died Sepl. 6, 198 1:
I) Within the three days , August 25-28, 1981 , tests and exa mina tion s indicated that
Mr. Herbert had suffered severe brain damage, leaving him in a vegetative state,
which was likely to be permanent.
2) Therea ft er, he was taken off the res pirator, all blood work a nd all intrave nous
fluids were terminated , a nd finally the nasogastric tube was removed.
3) As of August 31, he received no further nutrition, hydration or medication. From
that point until his death , M r. Herbert received only nursing care which preserved
his dignity and provid ed a clean and hygienic environ ment.
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4) Decision of the Court of Appeal of the State of Ca lifornia , Oct. 12. 1983:
A. The use of an intravenous administration of nourishment and fluid, under
the circumstances, is the same as the use of the respirator or other form of
life support equipment.
B. A treatment course which is only minimally painful or intrusive may
nonetheless be considered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the
prognosis is virtually hopeless for any significant improvement in
condition. (See generally President's Commission, Ch . 2, pp. 82-90.)
5) Decision seems to be based on a "quality af life"judgment.
2. State of New Jersey - The Case of Claire Conroy, age 84, died Feb. 14. 1983:
I) At the time of trial , Feb. 2, 1983, Ms. Conroy suffered from arteriosclerotic heart
disease , hypertension , and diabetes mellitus.
A. Her left leg was gangrenous to her knee; she had several necrotic decubitus
ulcers (bed sores) on her left foot, leg and hip.
B. An eye problem required irrigation.
C. She had a urinary catheter in place and could not control her bowels.
D. She could not speak and her ability to swallow was very limited.
E. She interacted with her environment in some limited ways.
2) Ms. Conroy was not brain-dead, comatose, or in a chronic vegetative state.
A. Both doctors testified that if the nasogastric tube were removed , she would die
a painful death of dehydration within a week.
B. The medical judgment was that even with treatment she probably would die
within one year. Death was not judged to be imminent.
3) Decision of the Superiar Court Judge Reginald Stanton. Feb. 2, 1983, was that
Ms . Conroy's life had become impossibly and permanently burdensome, and that
removal of the feeding tube should therefore be permitted . The guardian ad litem
appealed.
4) Decision of the Appellate Court. July 8, 1983, overruled the lower court's
decision , concluded that withdrawal of Ms. Conroy's nasogastric tube would be
tantamount to killing her - not simply letting her die - and that such act ive
euthanasia was ethically impermissible. N.B.: Claire Conroy died before this
decision was rendered.
5) Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Jan. 17, 1985, held that to remove
the nasogastric tube in particular cases, the medical evidence must establish that
the patient fits within the Claire Conroy pattern: an elderly, incompetent nursinghome resident, with severe and permanent mental and physical impairments, and
a life expectancy of approximately one year or less.
3. State of Massachusetts. T he Case of Paul Brophy:
I. Patient was a paramedic for the Eastern Fire Department
a. Patient had suffered a ruptured intracranial aneurysm in 1982.
b. His wife, a nurse, petitioned court for permission to remove gastrostomy tube.
c. Family stated that Brophy had , on several occasions, made clear his wish not to
be kept alive artificially should his condition become hopeless.
2. Court denied permission to remove gastrostomy tube
a. Court held that artificial feeding is neither invasive nor painful and that
discontinuation of feeding wou ld cause painful death .
b. Competent person has a general right to refuse treatment under appropriate
circumstances.
c. Brophy's desires , as expressed on his behalf by his guardian, were outweighed by
the state's interest in preserving Brophy's life.
3. Court distinguis hed the circumstances of the Brophy case from other cases covering
terminal illness in that
a. Brophy is not terminally ill.
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b. If Brophy were dying, it might be perm issib le to remove hi s tube as a response to
famil y's "substituted judgment".
c. Court would not decid e that Bro phy's life is not worth preserving.
d. Th e quality of life is an incorrect focus because there are no manageable criteria
for making such a judgment.
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